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5 November 1964

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State Department review completed

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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

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5 November 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 November 1964

DAILY BRIEF

USSR - Communist China: Consultations in Moscow this weekend among leaders of Sino-Soviet bloc parties, including Chou En-lai, probably will establish the framework within which the Sino-Soviet conflict will be conducted in the immediate future.

Peiping almost certainly estimates that recent developments have seriously weakened the Soviet position and have increased pressure on Moscow to abandon Khrushchev's timetable for a showdown with the Chinese. The Chinese delegation has apparently been carefully selected to convey the impression that Peiping is ready to undertake serious negotiations. Chou is the Chinese leader presumably most acceptable to Moscow.

Since Khrushchev's downfall, Moscow and Peiping have pursued cautious tactics, apparently awaiting moves which would reveal each other's intentions and possibly end the truce in polemics. Although the new Soviet leaders quickly reaffirmed most of the positions long attacked by Peiping, they have sought to create the impression that they desire to ease the tone of the conflict.

The Chinese, for their part, have privately welcomed Khrushchev's removal, addressed a congratulatory message to the new leaders, and indicated they were adopting a posture of "watchful waiting." The Chinese, however, also served notice that they would

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not compromise on "principles." They reprinted statements of pro-Peiping foreign Communists underlining obstacles to a rapprochement created by Moscow's adherence to previous positions.

Possibly in response to information that Chou En-lai would attend the anniversary celebrations, Moscow has recently alluded to two major positions most sharply attacked by Peiping over the past year--the partial nuclear test ban treaty and the proposal for a preparatory meeting for a new international Communist conference. A Pravda editorial on 1 November hailed the treaty as proof that Soviet foreign policy has achieved "positive results." A 2 November Soviet-Austrian party communiqué noted the need to proceed with the preparatory meeting but left open the question of timing.

The Soviets also sharpened political battle lines by publicly inviting the Yugoslavs to attend the Moscow ceremonies and by ignoring the Albanians.

Soviet tactics in the forthcoming talks probably will be designed to align the USSR with foreign Communist parties which wish to avoid a formal split with China. It is likely that the Soviets will represent these talks as affording the Chinese an opportunity to reconsider their opposition to a new conference and the preparatory meeting. The Russians undoubtedly will again disavow any intention to "excommunicate" the Chinese or to establish a new centralized Communist organization. The Pravda editorial called for restoration of unity on the platform of the Moscow pronouncements of 1957 and 1960 and on the basis of "complete equality and voluntary cooperation."

Chou En-lai may seek to counter these tactics and to block the preparatory meeting by renewing a

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bid for bilateral talks. Such a move would be aimed at facing the Soviets with a choice between appearing to rebuff an ostensibly conciliatory offer or postponing the preparatory meeting and agreeing to new bilateral talks, which would gain time for further Chinese efforts to weaken the USSR's position in the world movement.

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

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South Vietnam



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South Vietnam: The cabinet formed yesterday by Premier Tran Van Huong consists primarily of technicians who have reputations for competence.

Huong will serve as his own minister of defense. Deputy Premier Nguyen Luu Vien, an uncle of General Khanh's, will act also as interior minister and will be in charge of the civil aspects of the pacification program. These assignments should facilitate the civilian government's coordination with the military.

Chief of State Phan Khac Suu has formally tapped General Khanh to continue as commander in chief of the armed forces.

In making the appointments, the government seems to have encountered difficulties with the Buddhist community. In a conversation yesterday with Ambassador Taylor, Premier Huong attributed the last-minute withdrawal of two prospective members of his cabinet to Buddhist pressure. Huong accused the Buddhists of wanting to delay formation of the government long enough to organize street demonstrations aimed at forcing his own replacement by someone more tractable.

Buddhist reservations toward the new government appear to be reflected in Tri Quang's negative statement recently that he was not opposed to Suu and Huong because "neither of them has yet done anything bad."

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

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*South Vietnam: Viet Cong efforts to disrupt transportation routes have become increasingly effective in the past few weeks.

In central Vietnam, the coastal rail line between Qui Nhon and Quang Ngai was closed to traffic from 20 to 27 October after the Viet Cong removed the rails and dug up the track bed. Communist guerrillas frequently force the local inhabitants to assist them in such action. Viet Cong threats are making it increasingly difficult to recruit civilian maintenance personnel.

Enemy road sabotage has also been effective. The Viet Cong recently blew up a large bridge on National Route 1 in Quang Nam Province, forcing highway traffic to use a nearby railroad bridge.

Frequent enemy interdiction of Route 13 from Saigon to Binh Duong Province north of the capital has caused some commercial traffic to take a 600-mile detour. Government forces have managed to keep major roads open most of the time, but many secondary road nets are almost abandoned.

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

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France - Western Europe: There is growing evidence to support the view that Paris is considering actions which could jeopardize the basis for European and North Atlantic cooperation.

In addition to Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's speech of 3 November deprecating the MLF, De Gaulle is said to have approved a study which asserts that the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) is inimical to French national interests and recommends that France take swift countermeasures to obstruct its formation. 25X1

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he is also weighing alternatives to French participation in the EEC and NATO.

In his efforts to block any move that might undercut his concept of European unity, De Gaulle does not seem overly concerned with the prospect that France might become isolated from its allies. Hence he has not shrunk from adopting a hard-boiled attitude toward the Kennedy Round, the EEC and the MLF. Such a stance, in De Gaulle's view, may offer the best possibility for pursuing his concept of organizing Europe's defenses. 25X1 25X1

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NOTES

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[redacted]

Japan: Leftists are stepping up efforts to arouse public opposition to the imminent visit of a US nuclear-powered submarine. Some labor groups have cooperated with the Communist Party in mounting local demonstrations [and there is some evidence that Sohyo, the largest national labor organization, may openly join the Communists in stirring public protests.] 25X1
Communists and extremist students may attempt to give the demonstrations a violent turn. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

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